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Abstract
We study the valuation of unit-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guar-
antees. Instead of solving an optimal stopping problem, we propose a more realistic
approach accounting for policyholders’ rationality in exercising their surrender option.
The valuation is conducted at the portfolio level by assuming the surrender intensity
to be bounded from below and from above. The lower bound corresponds to purely
exogenous surrender and the upper bound represents the limited rationality of the
policyholders. The valuation problem is formulated by a valuation PDE and solved
with the ﬁnite diﬀerence method. We show that the rationality of the policyholders
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on average contract value and hence on the fair contract design.
We also present the separating boundary between purely exogenous surrender and en-
dogenous surrender. This provides implications on the predicted surrender activity of
the policyholders.
Keywords:unit-linked life insurance contracts, surrender guarantee, limited rationality,
fair contract analysis
JEL: G13, G22, C65
11 Introduction
Most unit-linked life insurance contracts entitle the policyholders to terminate the contract
before the maturity date and receive a certain cash refund called the surrender value. In
the literature, at least four approaches are found to evaluate such contracts. The ﬁrst ap-
proach is to consider the surrender decision as caused by exogenous reasons and a surrender
table can be constructed to capture the statistics on surrenders, see Bacinello [3]. The sec-
ond approach is to work within the contingent-claim framework and consider the surrender
option as an American-style contingent claim to be exercised rationally. This approach
is favored by most literature in recent years. Examples are Grosen and Jørgensen [12][13],
Bacinello [2][3], and Bacinello et al. [4], to just name a few. The argument is that the policy-
holder should not complain about the contract depreciation caused by his own non-optimal
surrender, even due to exogenous reasons like ﬁnancial diﬃculties, when he does have the
right to do it optimally. The third approach takes suboptimal surrender into consideration.
This is suggested by Bernard and Lemieux [5]. They consider a single policyholder’s deci-
sion behavior, which is characterized by a decision parameter. The policyholder is assumed
to exercise the surrender option only when the ratio between the surrender value and the
continuation value exceed the decision parameter. The fourth approach is carried out on
the portfolio level. It is ﬁrst proposed by Albizzati and Geman [1] who incorporate both the
exogenous and the endogenous surrender reasons into the valuation problem. They assume
that the proportion of surrender among the active contracts is an increasing function of the
ratio of the surrender value and the value when holding the contract until maturity. In case
the ratio is below one, the surrender rate is set to its minimum reﬂecting base level surrender
due to exogenous reasons. The surrender rate is then linear increasing with increasing ratio
until a ﬁxed upper bound is reached. The upper bound represents the maximal surrender
rate. Recently, similar idea was implemented by Giovanni [11] to model the policyholders’
rationality in contract surrender.
We consider the approaches of Albizzati and Geman [1] as well as Giovanni [11] as
more realistic than the other three approaches. The ﬁrst two approaches only address part
of the story. Surrender decisions are not only triggered by exogenous reasons but also by
endogenous reasons. The empirical study conducted by Kuo, Tsai and Chen [14] shows that
not only the unemployment rate (which corresponds to the exogenous surrender reason) but
also the interest rate (which corresponds to the endogenous surrender reason) has impact
on surrender behavior. Without treating the endogenous surrender risk properly, the policy
issuer will suﬀer an underestimated loss when disadvantageous ﬁnancial market movement
brings about more surrender cases than that have been summarized by the surrender table.
However, it has never been observed that all the policyholders simultaneously take the
same surrender action when it is optimal to do so. Treating the surrender action merely as
2an optimal stopping problem will overestimate the funds needed to manage the contracts.
Overall, it is diﬃcult to identify each policyholder’s decision rule and to ﬁgure out the
proportion of policyholders who are characterized by the same decision parameter. Since
the policy issuers cannot identify the rationality of the policyholders separately, all the
policyholders should be charged the same at the beginning. The premiums charged by
considering both the exogenous and the endogenous surrender reasons can be argued to be
reasonable on the portfolio level.1
Although we tend to follow Albizzati and Geman [1], we also bear in mind that there
are some limitations in their approaches that we try to avoid. In Albizzati and Geman [1],
mortality is considered as one of the surrender events. However, in most cases death beneﬁt
and surrender beneﬁt are not equal to each other. Surrender is usually accompanied by a
penalty in payment which does not apply to death beneﬁt. Hence, the distinction between
the death event and the surrender event should be considered. In addition, Albizzati and
Geman [1] assume that a policyholder surrenders the contract by comparing the surrender
value and the value of initiating a new contract which he holds till the maturity. A closed-
form solution is obtained by assuming independence between the surrender probabilities at
diﬀerent time points. However, usually a new contract also allows for surrender. In this
case, a surrender probability in the future also has inﬂuence on the surrender probability
at present. This eﬀect should be taken into consideration when evaluating a contract with
surrender guarantees. If the assumption about the independence between the surrender
probabilities is suspended, the Monte Carlo simulation method is suggested by them to
solve the valuation problem which is very time consuming.
In this paper we propose the intensity-based valuation of unit-linked life insurance con-
tracts with surrender guarantees. Surrender is not modeled as a binary event but random-
ized where the surrender intensity reﬂects the local likelihood of surrender. The intensity
based approach was ﬁrst used in credit risk modeling to describe the arrival of the credit
event. Recently, a similar approach has been adopted in other areas. For example, the
mortality risk embedded in insurance contracts is characterized by the mortality intensity,
(e.g. Milevsky et al. [17], Dahl [7], Dahl and Møller [8]) and the prepayment risk embedded
in mortgage loans is captured by the prepayment intensity (e.g. Stanton [19], Dai et al. [9]).
In our paper, we describe the arrival of the surrender event also by an intensity-based ap-
proach and solve the valuation problem for a representative policyholder. We assume that
the surrender intensity of the policyholder is bounded from below and from above. As in
Albizzati and Geman [1] and Giovanni [11] the lower bound represents the surrender base
level due to exogenous reasons. And the upper bound represents the maximal surrender
1For those competent policyholders who are able to exercise their surrender option optimally, less pre-
miums are charged than those are needed to support the contracts. It is the irrational policyholders who
have born the extra costs.
3rate that is attributed to exercise of the surrender option when it is ﬁnancially optimal to do
so. Since the optimal decision will not be made by all the policyholders simultaneously and
equivalently not by the representative policyholder, both the lower and the upper bound of
the surrender intensity are ﬁnite numbers between zero and inﬁnity.2 They can be easily
backed out from the relevant statistics in the past. By capturing the surrender risk with
the surrender intensity, and similarly, the mortality risk with the mortality intensity, we
are able to establish a partial diﬀerential equation whose solution is the contract value we
are looking for. The ﬁnite diﬀerence method is then applied to solve the problem. In this
sense, our approach is quite similar to Giovanni [11] but is also diﬀerent from him in two
aspects. We have incorporated the mortality risk in our model which is but ignored by
Giovanni [11]. In addition, we emphasize the fair contract design in our paper.
To formalize the problem, we introduce the model setup in Section 2. The valuation
of the contracts is carried out in Section 3. In Section 4 we study the impact of the
policyholders’ rationality on the contract value through numerical examples. Moreover, the
relationship of the parameters in the contract will be analyzed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup
Unit-linked life insurance contracts link the ﬁnancial market and the insurance market
together. On the ﬁnancial market, we assume that there is a non-dividend paying risky
asset with price process S and a riskless money market account with price process B.
Under the real world measure P, the two asset price processes are governed respectively by
the stochastic diﬀerential equations
dSt = a(t St)Stdt + σ(t St)St dWt   (1)
and
dBt = r(t)Bt dt  (2)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, where a is the local mean rate of return of the risky asset and σ is the
volatility of the risky asset. Both of them are Markovian. The risk-free interest rate r is
assumed to be deterministic. Moreover, W refers to the 1-dimensional Brownian motion
under P and generates the ﬁnancial market ﬁltration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T. The ﬁnancial market is
complete and arbitrage free, which is equivalent to the existence of a risk-neutral martingale
measure Q so that the price process S is described as
dSt = r(t)St dt + σ(t St)St d ˆ Wt  0 ≤ t ≤ T  (3)
2If the surrender option is exercised optimally, the surrender intensity switches between zero and inﬁnity.
4where ˆ W is a Brownian motion under Q which satisﬁes d ˆ Wt = dWt +
a−r
σ dt.
The insurance market is modeled by the random time τ denoting the death time of an
individual aged x at the starting time 0. The jump process associated with it is H with Ht =
1{τ≤t}, for t ∈ [0 T], and generates the ﬁltration H = (Ht)0≤t≤T. Furthermore, the hazard
rate of the random time τ (or the mortality intensity) is denoted by  . In recent literature,
the mortality intensity is often assumed to be stochastic based on the observation of the
systematic longevity risk in recent decades. However, in another paper [15] we ﬁnd that the
stochastic feature of the mortality intensity is of minor impact on unit-linked life insurance
contracts when the risk proﬁles at death and at maturity are not dramatically diﬀerent. We
assume here, therefore, that the mortality intensity is described by a deterministic function
 (t), for t ∈ [0 T]. In fact, the mortality risk is then unsystematic and can be diversiﬁed
away over a large pool of policyholders. Accordingly, we can work under the risk-neutral
measure Q extended to the enlarged ﬁltration G = F∨H such that ˆ W is a (Q G)-Brownian
motion and   is the (Q G)-intensity of H. See Bielecki and Rutkowski [6] for details.
3 Contract Valuation
In this section we introduce the contract and derive the valuation equation. The contract is
comprised of a survival beneﬁt, a death beneﬁt and a surrender beneﬁt. Survival beneﬁt and
death beneﬁt both oﬀer a guaranteed rate and the possibility to participate in a potentially
proﬁtable development of the risky asset. The surrender beneﬁt depends on time only,
eﬀectively representing a put option, see Bernard and Lemieux [5] for a similar approach.
The contract value is derived using the balance law of ﬁnancial economics, see Dai et al. [9].
We assume that the policyholder pays at the beginning time 0 the single premium P for
the contract with the maturity date T. The payoﬀ of the contract is linked to the underlying
asset S. When the policyholder survives time T, the payment to him is









where α refers to the percentage of the initial premium which is provided with the minimum
guaranteed rate g and k refers to the policyholder’s participation rate in the performance
of the underlying asset. When the policyholder dies at time τ < T, the death beneﬁt is










where the parameters gd and kd refer respectively to the minimum guaranteed rate and the
participation rate in the asset performance upon the occurrence of the death event. They
5need not be identical with g and k. However, in practice, death as a natural event is neither
penalized nor rewarded, so that g = gd as well as k = kd is very common. Furthermore, the
surrender beneﬁt is introduced into the contract. Following Bernard and Lemieux [5] we
set the surrender beneﬁt L to be independent of the asset performance. If the policyholder
surrenders the contract at time λ, he obtains
L(λ) = (1 − βλ)P (1 + h)
λ   (6)
where βλ is a penalty charge for the surrender action at time λ and h refers to the minimum
guaranteed rate for the surrender beneﬁt. The penalty β is typically constant over one
calender year and a decreasing function of time such that early surrender is more penalized.3
In practice the minimum guaranteed rate h is not allowed to fall below the minimum
guaranteed rate g for the survival beneﬁt, see Bernard and Lemieux [5].
Following our rationale in Section 1 we describe the arrival of the surrender action at a
random time λ by a generalized Poisson process with stochastic intensity γ. The intensity
γ depends on the relationship between the surrender beneﬁt L and the present value of the
contract V . When the surrender beneﬁt is smaller than the contract value, the surrender






ρ  for L(t) < Vt  
¯ ρ  for L(t) ≥ Vt  
(7)
This formulation is inspired by Dai et al. [9] and can be traced back to Stanton [19] who deals
with the prepayment terms in mortgage loans. In this way, we are not explicitly solving an
optimal stopping problem but a randomized version of it. However, in the limiting case,
when ρ ց 0 and ¯ ρ ր ∞, we obtain the solution to the accompanying optimal stopping
problem. Accordingly, our approach includes in the limit the aforementioned American-style
contingent claim analysis of Grosen and Jørgensen [12][13], Bacinello [2][3] and Bacinello,
et al. [4].
The next step is to establish the contract value V . There are at least two ways to
derive it. One is to evaluate the expectation under the risk-neutral measure. We follow an
alternative approach and derive the contract value by the PDE characterization using the
balance law, see Dai et al. [9]. However, in the appendix we provide a detailed derivation
of the main result in Proposition 1 below using the risk-neutral expectation. Of course, in
our Markovian setting both methods are connected via the Feynman-Kac theorems.
3For examples of penalty functions please refer to Palmer [18].
6The balance law is based on the no-arbitrage condition
r(t)Vtdt = EQ [dVt|Gt]   0 ≤ t ≤ T   (8)
Provided that the policyholder is still alive at time t and has not surrendered the contract
yet, we consider the following cases under the assumption that the two stopping times τ
and λ are conditionally independent of each other:
1) The conditional probability that death occurs over (t t + dt) while the surrender does
not is  tdt(1 − γtdt) =  tdt.
2) The conditional probability that surrender occurs over (t t + dt) while the death event
has not happened is γtdt(1 −  tdt) = γtdt.
3) The conditional probability that both the surrender and the death events occur over
(t t + dt) is 0.
Suppose that the contract value at time t is of the form Vt = 1{λ>t τ>t}v(t St) for a suitably
diﬀerentiable function v : [0 T] × R → R (t s)  → v(t s). Thus we can also express γt as a
function of the state variables, i.e. γt = γ(t St) where γ : [0 T] × R → R (t s)  → γ(t s).
Upon the occurrence of the death there is a change in the payment liability of the amount
Ψ(t s)−v(t s) and upon the occurrence of the surrender the change in the payment liability
is L(t) − v(t s). Hence, we can rewrite (8) as
r(t)v(t St)dt = EQ[dv(t St)|Ft] + (Ψ(t St) − v(t St)) tdt + (L(t) − v(t St))γ(t St)dt 
Applying the Ito’s Lemma to dv(t St) and assuming suﬃcient integrability we obtain
EQ[dv(t St)|Ft] = EQ[Lv(t St)dt + σ(t St)St
∂v
∂s
v(t St)d ˆ Wt|Ft] = Lv(t St)dt 
where L is the diﬀerential operator comprised of the partial derivative with respect to time













∂s2 (t s) 
Then we obtain
Lv(t s) +  (t)Ψ(t s) + γ(t s)L(t) − (r(t) +  (t) + γ(t s))v(t s) = 0 
By no-arbitrage, we must also have v(T s) = Φ(s), for all s > 0. We have just derived the
pricing PDE summarized in the following proposition.
7Proposition 1. The contract value is given by Vt = 1{λ>t τ>t}v(t St) where the price func-
tion v is the solution of the partial diﬀerential equation
Lv(t s) +  (t)Ψ(t s) + γ(t s)L(t) − (r(t) +  (t) + γ(t s))v(t s) = 0  (9)
for (t s) ∈ [0 T) × R+ with terminal condition v(T s) = Φ(s), for s ∈ R+.
By the Feynman-Kac theorem we obtain the immediate corollary.
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  0 ≤ t ≤ T   (10)
The contract value can be viewed as the discounted value of a ﬁctitious security with
the dividend payment at any time t being  (t)Ψ(t St)+γtL(t) and the ﬁnal payment at T
being Φ(ST). The discount factor in this ﬁctitious world is e−
R  
0(r(u)+ (u)+γu)du.
Remark 1. The results derived in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 can be generalized. We
have assumed that the bounds of the surrender intensity, ρ and ¯ ρ, respectively, are constant.
In fact, we can allow the bounds being driven by the ﬁnancial market and other non-ﬁnancial
state variables X, i.e. ρ
t = ρ(t St Xt) and ¯ ρt = ¯ ρ(t St Xt). Further, we can include
stochastic interest rates and stochastic volatility in our model. Under this extended setup
the valuation PDE in (9) and the value in (10) carry over.
The contract value V is inﬂuenced by the bounds ρ and ¯ ρ. Intuitively it is clear that a
lower value for ρ leads to less frequent surrender due to exogenous reasons and accordingly
increases the contract value. Likewise, a higher value for ¯ ρ allows a higher surrender activity
when it is ﬁnancially proﬁtable to do so and therefore increases the contract value. The
following proposition states this fact precisely. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose that v is the value function of the contract with bounds ρ and ¯ ρ,
and that w is the value function of the contract with bounds ζ and ¯ ζ. Assume that ζ ≤ ρ
and ¯ ρ ≤ ¯ ζ. Then we have w(t s) ≥ v(t s), for (t s) ∈ [0 T] × R+.
Corollary 2. In the setting of Proposition 2 deﬁne the sets where exclusively exogenous
surrender occurs by Cv = {(t s) ∈ [0 T] × R+ : L(t) < v(t s)} and Cw = {(t s) ∈
[0 T] × R+ : L(t) < w(t s)}, respectively. Then Cv ⊆ Cw.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.
84 Numerical Analysis
In this section we study the life insurance contract we have speciﬁed above closely through
numerical analysis. We assume that the underlying of the contract is the S&P 500 with
volatility σ(t s) = 0 2. The market interest rate is constant at r = 0 04. At the beginning
P = $100 is paid. The contract life time is 10 years. For the moment we assume that
the participation rate into the minimum guaranteed amount is α = 0 85. The minimum
guaranteed rates at survival, at death and at surrender satisfy g = gd = h = 0 02. The
participation coeﬃcient at survival and at death satisfy k = kd = 0 9. The penalty rates are
β1 = 0 05, β2 = 0 04, β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01 and βt = 0 for t ≥ 5. We further assume that the
mortality intensity follows the deterministic process  (t) = A + Bcx+t for the policyholder
aged x at time t = 0 with A = 5 0758 × 10−4, B = 3 9342 × 10−5, c = 1 1029. The pool of
policyholders are assumed to be 40-aged at the moment they enter into the contract, see Li
and Szimayer (2010) for a similar setup.
4.1 Rationality and Contract Price
We ﬁrst study the eﬀect of the policyholders’ rationality on the contract price. Table 1 dis-
plays contract values V0 for various rationalities of the policyholders that are parametrized
by the lower and upper bound of the surrender intensity γ. The lower bound ρ is the base
level surrender intensity representing surrender due to exogenous reasons, and takes the
values 0, 0 03, 0 3. The upper bound ¯ ρ limits the local exercise probability in case exercis-
ing the surrender option is ﬁnancially advantageous, see (7). It takes the values 0, 0 03, 0 3,
and ∞. We may say that a policyholders acts ﬁnancially more rational the lower the lower
bound ρ and the higher the upper bound ¯ ρ. It is clear that a higher degree of rationality
leads to a higher contract price, see Proposition 2.
¯ ρ
ρ 0 00 0 03 0 30 3 00 ∞
0 102 7630 103 9335 108 2971 110 6107 110 9602
0 03 - 99 4447 103 5910 105 5440 105 8250
0 3 - - 92 7071 94 4926 94 9999
Table 1: Contract value V0 for various bounds ρ and ¯ ρ for the surrender intensity.
For ρ = ¯ ρ = 0 00 the surrender option is never exercised. Therefore we obtain a
European-style contract with value 102 7630. Keeping ρ = 0 00 and increasing the upper
bound ¯ ρ to the limit ∞ results in a contract where the surrender option is exercised opti-
mally. The value of the American-style contract is 110 9602, and is about 8% higher than
the value of the corresponding European-style contract. In general we can observe that the
9contract values are increasing with increasing ¯ ρ as stated in Proposition 2. Purely exogenous
surrender can be presented by assuming that the upper and lower bound are identical, i.e.
ρ = ¯ ρ. The values on the diagonal of Table 1 are decreasing with increasing surrender rate.
This is not a general eﬀect but due to the fact that for this contract the surrender value L is
on average lower than the value V of a contract that is still alive. Fixing the upper bound
and varying the lower bound representing the exogenous surrender the contract values are
increasing with decreasing lower bound ρ what is in line with Proposition 2.
Let us now focus on the benchmark parameters for the subsequent fair contract analysis
in Section 4.3, i.e. set ρ = 0 03 and ¯ ρ = 0 30. The resulting contract value is 103 5910.
To obtain the corresponding purely exogenous surrender situation the upper bound is set
to ¯ ρ = 0 03 and the value decreases to 99 4447. In contrast, for optimal exercise of the
surrender option the upper bound is set to ∞. The corresponding contract value increases
to 105 8250. We can interpret the benchmark value of 103 5910 as a weighted average of
the purely exogenous surrender value and the value obtained when the surrender option is
optimally exercised, with weights 35% and 65%, respectively.
4.2 The Separating Boundary
For the insurance company writing the contract it is instructive to identify the actual
surrender intensity γ for any given time t and asset value St = s. According to (7) γ is
determined by the current contract value and surrender beneﬁt. Once the value function v
is obtained by solving the pricing PDE in Propostion 1 we can identify the region C where
purely exogenous surrender occurs, γ(t s) = ρ, i.e. C = {(t s) ∈ [0 T] × R+ : v(t s) >
L(t)}, and its complement Cc where surrender occurs at the maximal intensity, γ(t s) = ¯ ρ,
i.e. Cc = {(t s) ∈ [0 T] × R+ : v(t s) ≤ L(t)}. The separating boundary is then the
set ∂C = {(t s) ∈ [0 T] × R+ : v(t s) = L(t)}. Moreover, Corollary 2 characterizes the
relationship of C when the bounds of the surrender intensity ρ and ¯ ρ are varied. Decreasing
ρ or, alternatively, increasing ¯ ρ expands the set C where purely exogenous surrender occurs.
Figure 1 displays the separating boundary for the benchmark parameters on the left
and for the case when the upper bound of the surrender intensity is set to ∞ on the
right. For both ﬁgures we observe that a higher underlying price makes the participation
in it more attractive, and hence indicates a lower surrender rate in this region. While a
lower underlying price suggests that it is not promising to beneﬁt from the growth of the
underlying price. In addition, three factors aﬀect the separating boundary. One is the
interest rate eﬀect. In our example, the minimum guaranteed rates at death, at survival
and at surrender are all smaller than the interest rate on the market. An early surrender
enables the policyholders to invest their money into a riskless asset with a higher rate of
return than the minimum guaranteed rate and is hence preferred. The incentive to surrender
10Figure 1: The separating boundary ∂C for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 3 ∞}, α = 0 85, g = gd = h =
0 02, k = kd = 0 9, β1 = 0 05, β2 = 0 04, β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01 and βt = 0 for t ≥ 5.
the contract earlier can be reduced if the asset price is high enough so that the probability
of receiving a higher payoﬀ increases which oﬀsets the interest rate eﬀect. The second one
is the time eﬀect. For the same asset price level, the earlier it is, the more higher is the
possibility that the asset price at a certain time point in the future will rise to a higher level,
and hence, the higher is the continuation value of the contract. Thus, a lower asset price
at the early stage can be more tolerated and the separating boundary can be lower at this
stage due to the time eﬀect. The third one is the penalty eﬀect. In our example, there is
αP(1+g)t < (1−βt)P(1+h)t, for all t ≥ 0. Besides, (1−βt)P(1+h)t ≤ (1−βt′)P(1+h)t′
for t ≤ t′. This indicates that for S small enough, the surrender value is always higher
than the minimum guarantee. As time increases, the dominance of the surrender value is
more obvious, and hence, the asset price must be higher to compensate the disadvantage of
the relatively lower guaranteed amount. Figure 1 results from the three eﬀects mentioned.
Within one year, the interest rate eﬀect dominates, while between the diﬀerent years, the
other two eﬀects dominate. Consequently, the separating boundary is not smooth in the
ﬁrst 4 years and it is smooth and monotonically increasing afterwards. Comparing the
benchmark case (left in Figure 1) with the case where the upper bound ¯ ρ is set to ∞ (right
in Figure 1) we observe that the set indicating purely exogenous surrender C expands. This
is expected due to Corollary 2.
Now, the penalty term is eliminated by setting βt = 0 for all t. Then we obtain a
separating boundary as displayed in Figure 2. The penalty and the time eﬀect dominate the
interest rate eﬀect. Hence, we observe the monotonic increase of the separating boundary
over the life time of the contract. Moreover, the boundary is now smooth, since the penalty
parameters for diﬀerent years are identical. Again, the set C where purely exogenous
surrender occurs expands when the upper bound ¯ ρ is increased from 0 30 (left) to ∞ (right).
11Figure 2: The separating boundary of ∂C for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 3 ∞}, α = 0 85, g = gd =
h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9, βt = 0 for t ≥ 0.
4.3 Fair Contract Analysis
In this section we study how the parameters should be speciﬁed to ensure a fair contract, i.e.
V0 = P = 100. Since the contract price depends on the assumption about the rationality
of the policyholders in our model, our fair contract analysis is conducted in a narrow sense
by ﬁxing the rationality of the policyholders. The price obtained is the amount that should
be charged on average based on this assumption. We assume in this part that ρ = 0 03 and
¯ ρ = 0 30. Furthermore, we also compare the result with the case ¯ ρ = 0 03 and ¯ ρ = ∞. For
our original parameters chosen in Section 4.1 the contract value is 103 5910 and is therefore
over par. To reduce to the contract value, there are potentially three ways. The ﬁrst way
is to reduce the minimum guarantee at survival or at death or in both cases. The second
way is to enhance the penalty in the early surrender case. The third way is to reduce the
participation in the performance of the underlying asset.
We investigate the eﬀect of a reduction of the minimum guarantee on the contract value.
The reduction of minimum guarantee can be achieved either by reducing the participation
rate α, the minimum guarantee rate g1, or g2. Since their eﬀects are similar, we only focus
on the participation rate α. In Figure 3 we present the contract values with diﬀerent choices
of α while other parameters are kept the same as we chose at the beginning. We notice from
Figure 3 that the eﬀect of the minimum guarantee on the contract value depends on the
rationality of the policyholders. For the completely rational policyholders (i.e., ¯ ρ = ∞), the
minimum guarantee hardly has any eﬀect on the contract value. When the policyholders are
on average more rational than those who only surrender for exogneous reasons, the eﬀect of
the minimum guarantee is also minor. This is because a reasonable surrender guarantee is
supplied in the contract. If it is unproﬁtable to go on holding the contract, the policyholders








  ρ =0 03
  ρ =0 3
  ρ =∞
0.8703
Figure 3: The contract value V0 depending on the participation rate in the minimum guar-
antee α for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9, β1 = 0 05,
β2 = 0 04, β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01, and βt = 0, for t ≥ 5.
can simply terminate the contract and obtain the guaranteed surrender value which may
be higher than the minimum guarantee. On the contrary, for irrational policyholders (i.e.,
when ¯ ρ = 0 03), their surrender decisions do not depend on the surrender guarantee. The
eﬀect of the minimum guarantee on the contract value is hence much higher. We can verify
this rationale by setting the surrender to value to zero.










Figure 4: The contract value V0 depending on the participation rate in the minimum guar-
antee α for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9, βt = 1, for
t ≥ 0.
The contract values for β = 1, and hence L = 0, and various values for α are displayed
in Figure 4. We see that the contract value in this case is actually independent of the
rationality. This is because the surrender value is zero so that always the lowest surrender
13intensity ρ applies which is identical for the diﬀerent choices for ¯ ρ. We also see that when
the surrender guarantee is small the participation rate α plays a more important role in
determining the contract value. The contract values for α = 0 and α = 1 diﬀer by 10 3529
whereas in the previous setting the diﬀerence was just 2 3552, both for ¯ ρ = 0 30. The
pattern is similar for ¯ ρ = 0 03 and ¯ ρ = ∞. On the other hand we can interpret from
Figure 4 that to ensure the contract to be issued at par the policyholders should not be
overpenalized. In Bernard and Lemieux [5], the participation rate α is included both in the
minimum guarantee and in the asset performance. Hence, the variation of the parameter
works simultaneously on both parts which may display a more signiﬁcant eﬀect. However,
when we observe these two parts separately we are more clear about the speciﬁc eﬀect of
each parameter and gain insight into the design of eﬀective contracts. According to the
contract that we have designed we can simply keep α = 1 so that the contract looks more
attractive to the policyholders. While other parameters should be adjusted more carefully.













  ρ =0 03
  ρ =0 3
  ρ =∞
0.0821 0.1073
Figure 5: The contract value V0 depending on the penalty parameter β for ρ = 0 03,
¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, α = 0 85, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9.
Next, we investigate the relationship between the penalty parameter and the contract
value. In Figure 5 we display the contract value V0 as a function of penalty parameter
β graphically for diﬀerent degrees of rationality, ¯ ρ = 0 03 0 30 ∞. The contract value is
monotonically decreasing in the penalty parameter. For the contract to be fairly issued the
penalty parameter should be 0 0821 for ¯ ρ = 0 30. In case of rational surrender, i.e. ¯ ρ = ∞,
in presence of exogenous surrender with ρ = 0 03 the penalty parameter has to be increased
to 0 1073 for the contract to be fair. While for purely exogenous surrender, i.e. ¯ ρ = 0 03,
the contract value is always under par in our example. This means that other parameters
must be adjusted so as to take the policyholders’ irrationality into account properly.
Finally, we analyze the eﬀect of the participation rate in the asset performance on the
contract value. For simplicity we assume the participation rates for both, the survival and












  ρ =0 03
  ρ =0 3
  ρ =∞
0.7278 0.8006 0.9125
Figure 6: The contract value V0 depending on the participation rates k = kd for ρ = 0 03,
¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, α = 0 85, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9, β1 = 0 05, β2 = 0 04,
β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01, and βt = 0, for t ≥ 5.
the death events, to be the same namely, k = kd. Other parameters are consistent with
the values detailed at the beginning of Section 4. In Figure 6 we display the relationship
of the participation rates in the asset performance with the contract value graphically
for ¯ ρ = 0 03 0 30 ∞. We see that the contract value increases monotonically with the
participation rates. For ¯ ρ = 0 30 and ∞ the increase is not that large for small values of
the participation rates k = kd. This is because in these cases holding the contract generally
brings lower beneﬁt to the policyholders than surrendering the contract prematurely. The
surrender beneﬁt thus plays a dominant role in determining the contract value. Since the
surrender guarantee is independent of k and kd in our numerical example, the contract value
does not vary too for small values of k = kd. Also notice that that in this case the contract
value is under par. On the contrary, when k and kd are large the survival beneﬁt and the
death beneﬁt dominate the contract value, the contract value increases is more sensitive to
changes of k = kd. However, when the policyholders surrender due to exogenous reasons
(indicated by ¯ ρ = 0 03) the survival and death beneﬁt are driving the contract value. Hence
the eﬀect of an increase in k = kd on the contract value is nearly linear. To obtain a fair
contract the participation rates k = kd should be set to 0 8006 for ¯ ρ = 0 30. Increasing
¯ ρ to its limit ∞ requires a lower participation of k = kd = 0 7278 for ¯ ρ = 0 03 for the
contract to be fair. In contrast, for the cases of purely exogenous surrender, i.e. ¯ ρ = 0 03,
the participation rate has to increase to 0 9125 to constitute a fair contract.
In the remainder of this section we focus on the design of a fair contract and investigate
the interaction of various parameters. First, we study the relationship between participation
rate in the minimum guarantee α and the minimum guaranteed rate at survival and at
death g = gd. To produce realistic results we alter the benchmark parameters by setting














  ρ =0   0 3
  ρ =0   3
  ρ =∞
Figure 7: Parameter combinations of the participation rate in the minimum guarantee α
and the minimum guaranteed rates at survival and at death g = gd ensuring a fair contract,
for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 7, β1 = 0 05, β2 = 0 04,
β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01, and βt = 0, for t ≥ 5.
k = kd = 0 7 to ensure the existence of a fair contract. We present the relationship between
α and g = gd in Figure 7. We see that α is decreasing in g = gd. For α below 0 9
the minimum guaranteed rate of return at survival and at death must be higher than the
market interest rate for the contract value to be higher. Further note that the higher the
rationality of policyholders is, the lower is the α − g level in Figure 7. Since the more
rational policyholders can judge the situation more correctly and make the better out of it,
they need less compensation oﬀered by the minimum guarantee.














  ρ =0   0 3
  ρ =0   3
  ρ =∞
Figure 8: Parameter combinations of the participation rate in the minimum guarantee α
and participation rates in the asset performance at survival and at death k = kd ensuring a
fair contract, for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, g = gd = h = 0 02, k = kd = 0 9, β1 = 0 05,
β2 = 0 04, β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01, and βt = 0, for t ≥ 5.
16Next we study pairs of the participation rate in the minimum guarantee α and the
participation parameters in the asset performance k and kd such that a fair contract is
obtained. The other parameters are kept as in the benchmark case. A graphical illustration
for this setting is given in Figure 8. We observe that for the same level of α, a lower (higher)
k = kd is required to account for the higher (lower) rationality of the pool of policyholders.
Moreover, when the policyholders act more rational, the sensitivity of α with respect to
k = kd is higher, or in other words, the sensitivity of k = kd with respect to α is lower.
We have mentioned in Section 3 that the growth rate h for the surrender case is, in
practice, not allowed to fall below the minimum guaranteed rate g for the survival beneﬁt.
For our numerical analysis, however, we loose this restriction and study the relationship of
h with other parameters. As an example, we present in Figure 9 the relationship between
h and k = kd. It is obvious that for given k = kd, h must be set lower (higher) to
account for the higher (lower) rationality of the policyholders. For the policyholders with
low rationality, a fair contract may not even exist if we keep h at the same level as g, and
at the same time, only allow the policyholders to participate in the asset performance less
than proportionally.










  ρ =0 03
  ρ =0 3
  ρ =∞
Figure 9: Parameter combinations of the minimum guaranteed rate h for the surrender
beneﬁt and the participation rates in the asset performance at survival and at death k = kd
ensuring a fair contract, for ρ = 0 03, ¯ ρ ∈ {0 03 0 3 ∞}, α = 0 85, g = gd = 0 02, β1 = 0 05,
β2 = 0 04, β3 = 0 02, β4 = 0 01, and βt = 0, for t ≥ 5.
The above fair contract analysis tells us that the rationality of the policyholders should
also be taken into account when designing a fair contract.
175 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the valuation of unit-linked life insurance contracts with
surrender guarantees. Instead of solving an optimal stopping problem, we have proposed
a more realistic approach accounting for policyholders’ rationality in exercising their sur-
render option. The valuation is conducted at the portfolio level by assuming the surrender
intensity to be bounded from below and from above. The lower bound corresponds to
purely exogenous surrender and the upper bound represents the limited rationality of the
policyholders. In practice, the lower and the upper bounds can be obtained from historical
data. We have shown that for diﬀerent degrees of rationality indicated by the diﬀerence
between the lower and the upper bounds of the surrender intensity, the average contract
values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Hence, it is important to judge the rationality of the po-
tential policyholders realistically. Based on the realistic estimation of their rationality, the
contract can be designed more reasonably and an average overvaluation can be avoided. We
provide the separating boundary between purely exogenous surrender and surrender due to
ﬁnancial reasons. This may help insurance companies to better understand the surrender
activity of their policyholders aﬀecting also the companies’ hedge programs. In addition,
our fair contract analysis has revealed speciﬁc contract designs that are fairly robust with
respect to the degree of rationality of the policyholders.
This paper can be extended in several ways. As indicated in Remark 1 we can extend the
model to allow for stochastic interest rates and stochastic volatility. Further, the bounds ρ
and ¯ ρ need not be constant but can be driven by market variables and non-ﬁnancial factors.
The general results in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 and the respective corollaries are
likely to carry over. However, in a multi-factor model solving the valuation PDE can easily
become a high dimensional problem. In this case, least-squared Monte Carlo simulation
following Longstaﬀ and Schwartz [16] can be adapted. This issue will be addressed in future
research. A further interesting perspective is to incorporate a secondary market where the
policyholder are given the additional option to sell their contract to a third party. In an
extended version of our framework we plan to study the impact of a secondary market on
contract value and fair contract design.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The function v is the solution of the PDE (9) with terminal condition v(T s) = Φ(s)
and bounds ρ and ¯ ρ. The function w is the solution of the same PDE (9) with identical
terminal condition w(T s) = Φ(s) but diﬀerent bounds ζ and ¯ ζ. Assume that ζ ≤ ρ and
¯ ρ ≤ ¯ ζ. Now deﬁne z = w − v. It follows directly that z(T s) = w(T s) − v(t s) =
Φ(s)−Φ(s) = 0. To obtain the dynamics of z take the diﬀerence of the PDEs describing w
18and v, i.e.:
0 = Lw(t s) +  (t)Ψ(t s) + γ
ζ(t s)L(t) − (r(t) +  (t) + γ
ζ(t s))w(t s)
−(Lv(t s) +  (t)Ψ(t s) + γ
ρ(t s)L(t) − (r(t) +  (t) + γ
ρ(t s))v(t s))
= Lz(t s) + (γ
w(t s) − γ
v(t s))(L(t) − w(t s)) − (r(t) +  (t) + γ
v(t s))z(t s) 
were γv and γw, respectively, are given by (7) using the appropriate bounds. By Feynman-
Kac we obtain the stochastic representation of z as follows
z(t s) = E
t s
Q





t (r(x)+ (x)+γv(x Sx))dx(γ
w(u Su) − γ





Q denotes the expectation conditioned on St = s. From the deﬁnition of γw in (7)
and the assumption ¯ ζ ≥ ¯ ρ we see that if (L − w) ≥ 0 we have γw = ¯ ζ ≥ ¯ ρ ≥ γv and thus
(γw − γv) ≥ 0. On the other hand, if (L − w) < 0 then γw = ζ. By assumption we have
ζ ≤ ρ and thus γw ≤ ρ ≤ γv, or, (γw − γv) ≤ 0. Thus, we see that the integrand in the
above equation is nonnegative and therefore z ≥ 0. Since z = w − v we obtain w ≥ v.
Appendix B: Alternative Derivation of Proposition 1
To apply the martingale approach, we ﬁrst describe the arrival of the surrender event with
the jump process J satisfying Jt = 1{λ≤t} for t ∈ [0 T]. The jump process generates the
ﬁltration J = (Jt)0≤t≤T. We denote the joint ﬁltration of F, H and J as G. We know from
the speciﬁcation of the intensity of the jump process J that it is F-measurable. However,
it only determines the probable but not the real occurrence of λ. Mathematically it means
that the σ-ﬁelds FT and Jt are independent given Ft under the real world probability
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(Part 3: surrender beneﬁt value)(11)
Following Duﬃe et al. [10] we can express Vt with a so-called reduced form which we
summarize in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose the setup detailed in Section 2 and Section 3, the value process Vt

















t (r(s)+ (s)+γs)ds (u)Ψ(u Su)du














  0 ≤ t ≤ T   (12)
Proof. We prove the above equation part by part.
















   













The second equation follows from Bielecki et al. [6] Corollary 5 1 1. Notice that 1{λ>T}Φ(ST)
is (FT ∨ JT)-measurable. Similarly, the same argument leads to the third equation relying
on the FT-measurability of Φ(ST).
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Summing up (13), (14) and (15) we obtain (12).
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